Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success by Josh Lerner et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
SECRETS OF THE ACADEMY:










The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar, and Jialan Wang. All rights reserved. Short sections of
text, not to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.Secrets of the Academy: The Drivers of University Endowment Success
Josh Lerner, Antoinette Schoar, and Jialan Wang




In recent years, university endowments have received much attention for their spectacular returns and
innovative investment strategies, but few papers have examined trends in the endowment sector at
large.  In this paper, we analyze a sample of 1,300 educational endowments between 1992 and 2005.
A striking phenomenon emerges of the "rich getting richer", a dramatic widening of the size gap between
the largest endowments, led by the Ivy League, and the average endowment.  Growth in endowment
size has been driven largely by high investment returns, which are in turn related to the quality of the
student body and the use of alternative assets.  Elite endowments seem to benefit not only from economies
of scale in investment management, but genuine skill and expertise in choosing the right investments
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jialanw@mit.eduUniversity endowments are important and interesting institutions both in the investing 
community and society at large.  First, they play a role in maintaining the academic excellence of 
many universities which rely heavily on income from their endowments. In recent years, well-
heeled institutions such as Harvard and Princeton have used their deep pockets to increase 
admissions and reduce effective tuition rates, broadening access to elite education (Hoover, 
2007; Farrell, 2007). In contrast, poor finances can undermine a school’s ability to provide 
academic services all together.  In a dramatic recent case, the 150 year-old liberal arts institution 
Antioch College announced in 2007 that it would need to close its doors in 2008 due largely to 
financial woes.  While similar institutions such as Reed College, Oberlin College, and Kenyon 
College had endowments of over $100 million, Antioch’s endowment of only $36 million 
engendered financial insecurity, which contributed to decaying facilities and a declining student 
base (Carlson, 2007).  Although Antioch forestalled closure thanks to an emergency fund-raising 
drive, its financial future remains uncertain.  Another example comes from the University of 
Rochester, which in the early 1970s had had the third largest endowment in the country, after 
Harvard and the University of Texas. However, its endowment suffered poor returns in the 
subsequent two decades, and fell to the 25th largest by 1995. Among its poor choices were heavy 
allocations of its public equity portfolio to local companies such as Kodak and Xerox, which 
suffered substantial reversals during the period (Shea, 1995; “Manifold,” 1974). Largely as a 
result of its underperforming endowment, Rochester dramatically downsized its faculty and 
programs in the mid-1990s. 
Endowments have also received much attention recently for their superior investment 
returns compared with other institutional investors (Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsungwai, 2007). In 
this study, we document the trends in college and university endowment returns and investments 2 
in the United States between 1992 and 2005.  Such endowments overall have performed well 
over in this time period, with a median growth rate of 7.4 percent per year and median return of 
6.9 percent, according to our data on 1300 schools. This sector has been dominated both in size 
and performance by the endowments of elite universities such as the Ivy League schools.   The 
top 20 endowments grew more than 9 percent annually on a real basis between 1992 and 2005. 
As of 2007, the two largest endowments, belonging to Harvard and Yale, have grown to $35 
billion and $22 billion in size, respectively.  These results suggest an increasing skewness of 
endowment sizes, where the rich universities are getting richer while the rest of the schools are 
falling behind. 
Much of the growth in endowment size has been driven by investment performance.  As 
we will shown in the paper,, the top endowments posted impressive returns in 2005, averaging a 
net real return of 12.3 percent compared to 4.4 percent posted by the Standard & Poor’s 500 
index in the same year.  Indeed, over the past two decades, a significant number of college and 
university endowments have been in the top percentile of performance among all institutional 
investors.  Based on rankings of performance of large defined benefit plans from financial 
research firm SEI, 5 percent of college and university endowments exceeded the top percentile 
return for corporate pension funds between 1996 and 2005. We investigate the underlying drivers 
of these high returns and show that performance is related to the size of endowment, the quality 
of the student body, and the use of alternative investments.  
Our results also suggest caution to investors seeking to reap similar rewards by copying 
the investment strategies of top endowments.  Across endowments, institutional characteristics 
such as endowment size and admissions selectivity are better predictors of success than the 
allocation to risky asset classes.  Moreover, top endowments seem to possess superior asset 3 
selection ability beyond their strategies for allocating funds to certain asset classes.  While we 
cannot pinpoint the channel through which more selective schools make better investments, 
qualitative evidence suggests that these endowments benefit from superior investment 
committees (the bodies charged with providing oversight and guidance to the endowment 
managers), more highly-skilled investment managers, and the broader knowledge bases and 
social networks of the schools themselves. Furthermore, while investments in risky asset classes 
such as alternative assets have on average been very successful, there have also been some 
dramatic losses, like the $350 million investment loss that Harvard recently experienced in 
Sowood Capital Management (Karmin and Zuckerman, 2007). Thus, our findings do not imply 
that ordinary investors could achieve similar results by mimicking the strategies of top 
endowments. Indeed, the same strategies that have worked so well for the endowments in the 
past two decades may not do so in the future.  
 
Facts about Endowments 
 
While university endowments have attracted an increasing amount of publicity in recent 
years for their explosive growth and spectacular performance, few studies have examined 
systematic trends in the endowment sector as a whole.
1  For the most comprehensive data on 
endowment returns, asset allocations, and returns, we turn to annual surveys conducted by the 
National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO).  Membership in 
NACUBO currently includes 2,500 public and private institutions, and the schools in our sample 
represent about a quarter of the student population in four-year institutions nationwide. On an 
annual basis since the 1970s, NACUBO has conducted voluntary surveys of member schools 
                                                 
1 A contemporaneous paper using similar data is Brown et al. (2007). 4 
regarding endowment returns and investment characteristics. Participation in this survey has 
increased steadily year by year, and we focus our analysis on the period from 1992 to 2005, over 
which data from nearly 1,300 schools are available.  Due to data availability, we use data from 
1993 to 2005 when analyzing aggregate returns and allocations by asset class. We further restrict 
the sample to 2002 to 2005 when looking at asset class returns and some institutional 
characteristics.  We supplement the NACUBO surveys with data from the College Board, a non-
profit organization that administers the SAT and other educational assessments and which 
collects information on each school’s student population, including total number of enrolled 
students and the percentile scores on the SAT. 
In general, the schools included in the NACUBO surveys tend to be larger, more 
selective, and more likely to be private than the average school: our endowment data covers 
about 45 percent of the private schools in the College Board sample, but only 18 percent of the 
public schools. In particular, the NACUBO data has much better coverage of small private 
schools than of small public schools.  Despite this sample selection issue, the results in this paper 
are qualitatively similar when we assume a similar coverage ratio of private and public 
endowments by dropping the smallest private endowments from the sample. 
Table 1 presents some summary statistics for our data, presenting snapshots of the overall 
sample and public, private, and Ivy League schools in 1993 and 2005.  In particular, throughout 
this study we contrast Ivy League and non-Ivy League schools.
2 Because the Ivy League has 
historically been a focal point for public opinion on both higher education and endowment 
investment, we present separate statistics for these schools to identify differences between the 
                                                 
2 The Ivy League is an old nickname for a set of schools that formed an athletic association in 1954, which includes 
Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University, Dartmouth College, Harvard University, University of 
Pennsylvania, Princeton University, and Yale University.   5 
endowments of these elite institutions and the typical endowment. To avoid overlap, we exclude 
Ivy League schools from the sample of private schools in the table.   
Overall, private schools comprise 63 percent of our sample, and public schools comprise 
37 percent. Despite large differences in the size of their student populations, endowment 
characteristics differed only moderately between public and private schools.  Private schools 
have tended to invest more aggressively in alternative assets (like hedge funds, private equity, 
and commodities), and they have achieved slightly higher overall returns and asset class returns.  
While investment returns were similar for public and private schools, endowments for public 
schools grew 4 percent more per year than private schools between 1993 and 2005, suggesting a 
larger role for donations (or government transfers) in public endowments. 
Despite higher endowment growth rates, public schools have had much lower endowment 
values per student than private schools.  They have also experienced higher tuition increases, 
with median annual tuition hikes of 3.8 percent versus 2.5 percent for private schools.  For 
example, while Texas A&M University has maintained one of the largest educational 
endowments in the nation throughout the sample period (see Table 2), its endowment amounted 
to less than $60,000 per student in 1993, and tuition grew by over 16 percent per year between 
1993 and 2005.  In contrast, Columbia University’s endowment was of similar size but 
represented nearly $560,000 per student in 1993, and tuition grew by only 2.2 percent over the 
same period. 
  While the median public and median private school endowments were roughly the same 
size in both 1993 and 2005, the median endowment in the Ivy League dwarfed the typical 
endowment by orders of magnitude (all except Dartmouth and Brown are listed among the 20 
largest endowments in Table 2).   Furthermore, the gulf had widened dramatically: while the 6 
median Ivy League endowment was about 40 times larger than the median public endowment in 
1993, this multiple was up to 70 times by 2005.  The same pattern emerges when considering we 
divide endowments by the size of their investment pools or by the SAT scores of the student 
body. Hence, we consistently find a “rich get richer” phenomenon among educational 
endowments.   
These changes in endowment size come from three major sources: investment returns, 
donations, and spending.  While our data provide very limited information on donations, Table 1 
indicates that spending rates out of endowments differ only slightly across institutions.   
However, investment returns vary dramatically and are a major source of differences in 
endowment growth.  In the next section, we will explore the drivers of investment performance 
across endowments. 
 
Trends in Endowment Returns 
 
As shown in Table 1, endowments have generally enjoyed healthy returns between 1993 
and 2005, but they also display considerable heterogeneity.  Do schools with different 
characteristics show consistent differences in returns?  Figure 1 plots the patterns in excess 
returns above the Standard & Poor’s 500 for several subsets of schools in each year of the 
sample.  As shown in Figure 1, the Ivy League schools realized dramatically higher excess 
returns compared to the rest of the endowments, outperforming the overall median by more than 
3 percent per year.  Note that in contrast to Table 1, the figures are derived from data which 
excludes schools reporting less than 10 years of data between 1992 and 2005.  This difference is 
particularly striking in 2000, when Ivy League schools outperformed the other universities by 14 7 
percent.  In contrast, private universities excluding the Ivy League performed almost identically 
to the overall average.   
Large schools and those with high student SAT scores also performed very similarly 
between 1992 and 2005, with returns which generally exceeded the overall average.  As shown 
in Figure 1, the median schools in the top quartiles by SAT score and by endowment size 
outperformed the overall average by 1.3 percent per year in this period.  In unreported results 
which sort schools by these two variables in 1992, a 10-percentile increase in either variable is 
associated with higher returns in every year between 1992 and 2005 across the entire range of the 
two variables.  Hence, although endowment size and student SAT score are somewhat correlated 
(with a correlation coefficient of 0.4), our analysis suggests that both variables correlate 
positively and independently with endowment performance. 
Endowment size may play a role because of economies of scale in endowment 
management.  Small endowments are often managed by general university financial officers who 
may not be trained in sophisticated asset management, while the largest endowments are able to 
hire a mixture of skilled inside and outside managers with specific expertise for their investment 
goals and asset compositions.
3  While the SAT scores of a university’s students are unlikely to 
directly affect investment performance, average SAT score may be a proxy for the skill of the 
university administration, the wealth and connections of the alumni network, and the prestige of 
the university brand, all of which could affect endowment management over and above the role 
of endowment size.  These factors may have played a role in the success of Williams College, 
which achieved an inflation-adjusted return of 11.7 percent per year between 1992 and 2005 with 
                                                 
3 The choice between relying on outside managers and internal staff pose many interesting issues, which we do not 
analyze here, due to a lack of time-series data in the NACUBO data-set. The Yale and (traditionally) the Harvard 
endowments provide illustrations of organizations which have respectively followed these two strategies with 
considerable success.  8 
an $1.3 billion endowment in 2005 and 75
th-percentile SAT score of 750, beating out schools 
such as University of Pittsburgh which had larger endowments but significantly lower SAT 
scores.  Without more detailed data, however, we cannot identify the specific channels through 
which size and SAT score affect endowment performance, so useful insights could be gained 
from future research into these institutional characteristics. 
Finally, Figure 1 also suggests a remarkable persistence in the performance of 
endowments year after year.  As shown in the figure, top endowments such as those of the Ivy 
League (and more generally, large endowments and those of high-SAT schools) tend to post 
consistently above-average returns.  Upon further investigation, we find that persistence also 
holds true at the low end: endowments which perform worse than average continue to do poorly 
year after year.  These results corroborate the findings in a recent paper by Lerner, Schoar, and 
Wongsunwai (2007), which also reported persistence in returns at the institutional investor level. 
While that paper focused only on returns in private equity, it is striking that we find persistence 
of returns for educational endowments which invest across wide spectrum of asset classes, 
including those in highly efficient markets such as those for stocks and bonds. In the next 
section, we will take a closer look at the investment strategies adopted by educational 
endowments. 
 
Asset Allocation and the Role of Alternative Assets 
 
Much of endowment performance is achieved through allocation decisions between asset 
classes which have different risk and return characteristics.  Specifically, we examine 
endowment investment across five major asset classes: equities, fixed income, real estate, 9 
alternatives (which includes hedge funds, commodities such as oil and timber, and private equity 
buyout and venture funds), and cash. While the 1970 and 1980s saw a gradual move by 
endowments away from fixed income securities and cash into equities, our sample period 
witnessed a shift away from equities and fixed income toward the sophisticated, often illiquid 
alternative assets.  Figure 2 provides an overview of the allocation of university endowments by 
asset class between 1993 and 2005.  The combined share of equities and fixed income fell from 
83 percent in 1993 to 73 percent in 2005. At the same time, the share of alternatives rose from 11 
to 21 percent, leaving the shares of real estate and cash holdings essentially constant.  
While endowments overall have increased their allocations toward alternative assets, 
tremendous heterogeneity still exists in the share of the total endowment invested in alternatives.  
Figure 3 shows the median share of investments devoted to alternative investments among five 
subsets of endowments. As shown in the figure, schools with high SAT scores and large 
endowments began the shift toward alternative assets earlier than the typical school and have 
consistently placed a larger share of their assets in alternative investments.  
The share of endowments at Ivy League schools devoted to alternative assets had been 
even bigger: they consistently invested twice as much into alternative assets than the median 
school (the medians for the Ivy League and the entire sample are 9.3 vs. 4.3 percent in 1993; 38 
vs. 12 percent in 2005).  The Yale endowment provides an extreme example: at the end of the 
2006 fiscal year, the university’s target allocation was to hold 69 percent of its portfolio in 
private equity, hedge funds, and real estate (Lerner, 2007).  Thus, the endowments with the best 
performance have also allocated most aggressively toward alternative investments.  
A natural conclusion from this evidence might be that endowments which are lagging 
ought to shift their allocations toward alternative assets. Some institutional investors around the 10 
world have reached this conclusion: for instance, the Kuwait Investment Fund decided to 
emulate Yale’s allocation when shifting its investment strategy (Sender, 2007). However, we 
argue in this paper that simply mimicking the asset allocation strategies of the best endowments 
may not lead to the same stellar results. 
One reason is that superior endowment performance may be due not just to asset class 
allocation, but also to selection of assets within each class.  Although we cannot precisely 
determine the returns an arbitrary investor could achieve by passively following the allocation 
strategies of endowments, Table 3 presents aggregate comparisons between returns realized by 
endowments and benchmark returns from broad indices in the five major asset classes.  While 
endowment returns roughly tracked benchmark returns between 1994 and 1999, between 2000 
and 2005 all subsets of endowments consistently outperformed their benchmarks.  This trend 
may indicate that endowments have become more skilled at selecting assets within asset classes 
over time.  However, it may also result from the banner performance of riskier assets such as 
emerging-market equities, and alternative assets which have been recently favored by 
endowments--and these assets are not guaranteed to perform equally well in the future.   
 Overall, roughly 73 percent of endowment returns between 1994 and 2005 is accounted 
for by the benchmark asset class returns weighted by aggregate allocations to these classes.  This 
value is about 77-78 percent for large endowments and the endowments of private schools and 
high-SAT schools.  In contrast, benchmark returns account for only 66 percent of the returns of 
Ivy League schools, indicating that the top endowments do more than just correctly time 
investment in particular asset classes. The large role of expertise in the performance of top 
endowments should caution against naïve imitation of their allocation strategies.   11 
This warning is especially true for investments in alternative assets, where poor selection 
can have significant negative effects.  Alternative assets vary considerably in their performance, 
and Table 3 indicates that Ivy League schools possess investment skills and options the average 
investor would probably be unable to match.  More detailed analysis shows that schools which 
entered earlier into alternative assets (which tended to be those with larger endowments and 
higher SAT scores) achieved higher returns within this asset class, even after controlling for the 
percentage allocation to alternatives. 
The perils faced by schools unfamiliar with alternative investments can be illustrated by 
the experience of Boston University. The school’s administration established its own venture 
capital subsidiary; in contrast, most leading universities have done the bulk of their alternative 
investing through outside partnerships, rather than trying to undertake these activities directly. 
The fund invested in Seragen, a privately held biotechnology company founded in 1979 by 
scientists affiliated with Boston University. The result of this investment can be described based 
on Seragen’s filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. As part of the school’s 
initial investment in 1987, it bought out the stakes of a number of independent venture capital 
investors, who had apparently concluded after a number of financing rounds that the firm’s 
prospects were unattractive. Between 1987 and 1997, the school, investing alongside university 
officials and trustees, provided at least $107 million dollars to the private firm. (By way of 
comparison, the school’s entire endowment in the fiscal year in which it initiated this investment 
was $142 million.) While the company succeeded in completing an initial public offering, it 
encountered a series of disappointments with its products. By late 1997, the University’s equity 
stake was worth only about $4 million.  12 
This pattern in which alternative investments provide high returns only to a few top 
endowments is consistent with previous analysis of the returns from private equity investments 
(Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai, 2007). While the returns from private equity investments for 
the top 25 percent of the endowments in that sample far outperform those of any other class of 
investor, the other schools have relatively modest returns that are indistinguishable from those of 
average investors. In particular, the two most consistent correlates with private equity 
performance were the SAT scores of the student body and the rate of the alumni giving.  Why 
might alternative investments perform better for some schools than others? Although we do not 
have detailed data to support our arguments here, the key factors are likely to be access, 
experience, and timing.  
On the issue of access, many of the most successful private equity and hedge funds are 
essentially closed to new investors and have been so for many years. Thus, one important aspect 
of having been pioneers in alternative investments is that the Ivy League endowments enjoy a 
“seat at the table” in some of the most elite and desirable groups. An endowment just beginning 
an alternative investment program is unlikely to be able to access the top-tier or even the second-
tier alternative funds. However, access cannot explain all of the superior returns of established 
endowments. In Lerner, Schoar, and Wongsunwai (2007), we found that top endowments even 
outperformed the rest of the investors when investing in undersubscribed funds, which suggests 
that those endowments were able to pick better funds even when all investors had access. 
Much of success of alternative investment programs comes from experience: there is a 
great deal of disparity in the returns of individual managers within the asset class, placing a 
premium on manager selection (for instance, see the data in Yale, 2006). Furthermore, the long 
lags between the time when investments are made and when their success can be evaluated 13 
highlight the importance of experience in interpreting ambiguous data in making fund selection 
decisions.  Hence, the experience gained by Ivy League schools which were among the first 
institutional investors to invest in alternatives may be a major factor in their continued success. 
Finally, part of the success of alternative investments may be attributed to good timing.   
The past 25 years viewed as a whole have been a benign environment for many alternative funds. 
On the venture capital side, there has been extensive innovation and (until 2000) a robust market 
for new issues. Buyouts and hedge funds have benefited from the plethora of “value” investment 
opportunities in recent years and (until late 2007) the ready availability of debt finance on 
favorable terms.  Whether these conditions will continue to hold in the decade to come remains 
to be seen. 
 
Compensation and Endowment Managers 
 
The skill and experience of investment managers appear to play a large role in the 
success of endowment investments, so differing abilities to attract and compensate talented 
managers may help explain the disparities in investment performance across endowments.   
Compensation of internal investment staff has proven intensely controversial at some schools. 
For example, two bond traders within Harvard’s endowment group, David Mittelman and 
Maurice Samuels, each earned roughly $34 million in 2003. After an outcry, their compensation 
was capped at $25 million in 2004, a measure which did little to quiet the controversy (Seward, 
2005).  Although these numbers are high compared to the typical salaries of university staff, 
even the most highly-paid endowment personnel are compensated at a level that is generally far 
below what many of them would make at a hedge fund or other private organization. 14 
We examine the compensation of investment officers using data provided by GuideStar 
for schools in which endowment officers are one of the five highest-paid employees, between 
1997 and 2004.
4  For a sample of 206 employee-year observations, we find compensation levels 
which are relatively modest by the standards of the private-sector financial industry. The mean 
compensation for a reported endowment officer was $1.9 million.  Furthermore, compensation 
levels seem to increase with excess returns as well as size and SAT scores, which from above are 
consistently correlated with performance. Among schools where compensation data are 
available, endowment officers in the top quarter of schools by excess return above the Standard 
& Poor’s 500 are paid $4.2 million compared to $1.7 million for those in the bottom quarter, 
those in the top quarter by endowment size are paid on average $5.3 million compared to 
$100,000 for the bottom quarter, and those in the top quarter of schools by SAT score are paid 
$6.1 million on average compared to $130,000.  Are the top endowments more successful 
investors because they pay their endowment managers more, or does the fact that the pay them 
more reflect their success (and deep pockets)? 
The association between the level of compensation and staff longevity seems weak at 
best, so the evidence here is only qualitative. For instance, a number of schools that have offered 
or discussed offering substantial incentive-based compensation to their staff, such as Harvard 
(Seward, 2005) and Stanford (Grant and Buckman, 2006), have also been among those hit by 
large-scale defections of investment staffs. Apparently, many schools with established, 
successful investment staffs have maintained them by emphasizing the non-pecuniary benefits 
that come from being a part of an academic community.  
                                                 
4 One practical issue is how to recognize endowment staff in these reports. We define endowment staff as anyone 
whose title includes words such as “investment,” “endowment,” or “asset,” or whose titles otherwise indicate direct 
involvement in endowment management. Another practical difficulty relates to matching the NACUBO and 
GuideStar data. For instance, in some cases, a multi-branch university will undertake a single 990 filing but fill out 
multiple responses to the NACUBO survey, or vice versa. 15 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Many unanswered questions remain about university endowments. Three gaps in our 
understanding seem particularly interesting from an academic perspective and are especially 
relevant for those who run or oversee university endowments and other investment pools.  
First, how does the way in which endowment offices are organized contribute to their 
returns? This question reflects a more fundamental gap in our understanding: While a 
voluminous literature exists on the pricing, risk, and returns of various types of assets, the 
organizational economics of investing, such as the challenges that institutional investors face in 
recruiting and rewarding investment professionals, remains poorly understood. 
When we considered the top-performing university endowments and contrasted them 
with other institutional investors, several organizational features of the endowments stand out. 
First, the top-performing endowments have active investment committees, typically drawn from 
the ranks of alumni. These bodies typically see their role not as micro-managing the decisions of 
the investment staff, but rather in setting broad policy and serving as an informed sounding 
board. The contrast with public pension funds, where the bulk of the staff is drawn from rank-
and-file employees, is particularly stark. Second, the staff of successful academic endowments 
typically has considerable experience and has often worked together for many years. Finally, the 
staff of successful university and college endowments has an academic orientation, which leads 
to a process of periodic self-evaluation. Many of these funds occasionally stop to consider the 
processes that led them to make investments that proved particularly successful or problematic. 
They often engage in an active dialog with their peers.  16 
It would be useful to develop a better understanding of how these features affect success. 
In addition, given that the demand for investment talent is probably greater than it has ever been, 
it would be interesting to see whether these organizational features will be sustainable over time. 
The increased interest in alternative investments, and the demand for talent to lead the growing 
number of investment funds pursuing sophisticated strategies world-wide, are likely to increase 
the temptation for endowment managers to pursue their activities elsewhere. Whether the 
attraction of working for the good of an academic institution will be sufficient to retain top 
performers remains to be seen. 
Second, will the strategies pursued by endowments remain viable going forward? The 
past two decades have been kind to alternative investment strategies pursued by many leading 
endowments, but it is unclear whether these patterns will hold into the future. The large 
endowments—and those of the Ivy League schools in particular—are considerably less 
correlated with the equity market and have greater exposure to the more volatile smaller stocks. 
These patterns highlight the extent to which these schools have been willing to pursue distinctive 
investment strategies.  
Understanding the institutional qualities which allow some endowments to pursue 
unconventional investment strategies is particularly relevant because in a number of past 
episodes, schools pursued investment strategies that ultimately would have been successful, but 
were forced to abandon them when initial losses triggered media scrutiny and alumni complaints. 
To cite one vivid example, the Ford Foundation encouraged universities to increase investment 
in small-capitalization stocks in the late 1960s. A task force consisting of McGeorge Bundy, the 
foundation’s president, and a number of distinguished academic leaders reviewed the historical 
returns data, and wrote: “It is our conclusion that past thinking by many endowment managers 17 
has been overly influenced by fear of another major crash. Although nobody can ever be certain 
what the future may bring, we do not think that a long-term policy founded on such fear can 
survive dispassionate analysis” (Advisory Committee, 1969).  
If followed for the next several decades, this recommendation would have yielded very 
attractive returns, but it led to severe losses in the short-term for a number of university 
endowments that increased their allocation to small-capitalization stocks at the peak of the 1960s 
bull market. During much of the 1970s, returns were poor for stocks in general and small-
capitalization stocks in particular, leading to bitter criticism of endowment staffs by the media, 
alumni, and their investment committees. In the face of unrelenting criticism, many schools 
abandoned their small-cap strategies at exactly the wrong time. (Lerner (2007) discusses this 
report and its consequences at one school.)  More recent examples along the same lines include 
endowment managers who attempted to hedge their exposure to venture capital in the late 1990s, 
but who were forced by their investment committees to abandon their positions right before the 
2000 technology market collapse after experiencing several quarters where the hedges lost 
money. Perhaps further research into the dynamics and conflicts within organizations would help 
schools avoid repeating these episodes in the future. 
A final concern relates to the challenges of imitation. The alternative investment markets 
on which successful endowments have relied are particularly vulnerable to influxes of capital 
(Gompers and Lerner, 2000;  Kaplan and Schoar, 2005; Ljungqvist, Richardson, and Wolfenzon, 
2007). A given sector often has a limited number of opportunities, so additional capital tends to 
be associated with the purchase of securities at higher prices and ultimately lower returns. This 
effect is particularly relevant because the strategies of the elite endowments are being scrutinized 
and imitated as never before.  18 
In the past, there was often a substantial lag between the time endowments first began 
investing in an asset class and when other institutions followed. For instance, many of the Ivy 
League schools began investing in venture capital in the early 1970s, but most corporate 
pensions did not follow until the 1980s and most public pensions did not follow until the 1990s. 
These lags have become much shorter. Within a couple of years of Harvard initiating a program 
to invest in forestland, for instance, many other institutions adopted similar initiatives. The same 
dynamics are at play at the individual fund level: an investment by an elite endowment into a 
fund can trigger a rush of capital to the same fund. Indeed, increased disclosure of endowment 
holdings as a response to demands by activist students (often on ethical grounds), would be 
likely to intensify the problem of imitative investment. Fund managers for private equity and 
other alternative assets, who are of course aware of these dynamics, have been able to use the 
increased demand for their funds as way to increase their own returns (Buckman, 2007), which 
tends to reduce the returns that endowments and imitative investors can receive.   
In short, while we document a period of remarkable success for endowment investments, 
much remains to be understood about the sources of their performance, whether they can 
continue to succeed, and whether the approaches of the successful endowment managers can be 
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 1993  2005  Median 
Growth  All  Median #  schools  Median #  schools 
Endowment  size  ($mil)  60 533  72 726  7.4% 
%  endowment  return  13.2% 486  9.0% 707     
% alternative allocation  4.8%  50  7.6%  712  23.8% 
% equity allocation  60.1%  58  59.6%  719  -1.4% 
% fixed income allocation  31.5%  52  20.4%  719  -3.1% 
Spending  rate  5.0% 350  4.9% 681  0.3% 
Total  students  2271 875  2283 879  0.6% 
SAT math 75th percentile  590  555  620  563  0.4% 
Tuition  ($)  11,556 643  16,490 879  2.7% 
Ivy League                
Endowment  size  ($mil)  2,040 8  4,780 8  8.6% 
% alternative allocation  17.6%  5  37.1%  6  23.0% 
%  equity  allocation  52.9% 5  38.1% 6  -2.3% 
% fixed income allocation  27.8%  5  13.0%  6  -1.4% 
Spending  rate  4.6% 7  4.6% 6  0.6% 
Total  students  5600 8  5510 8  0.3% 
SAT math 75th percentile  735  8  760  7  0.4% 
Tuition  ($)  24,023 6  29,995 8  1.8% 
Public                
Endowment  size  ($mil)  50 129  66 187  10.6% 
% alternative allocation  2.9%  10  5.2%  185  22.0% 
% equity allocation  61.4%  12  60.5%  187  -1.2% 
% fixed income allocation  33.6%  11  22.1%  187  -3.6% 
Spending rate  5.0%  79  4.4%  174  -0.2% 
Total  students  9800 272  9280 272  0.4% 
SAT math 75th percentile  580  119  610  136  10.6% 
Tuition  ($)  2,343 208  3,591 272  3.8% 
Private                
Endowment  size  ($mil)  60 353  72 471  6.3% 
% alternative allocation  5.3%  32  9.0%  461  26.0% 
% equity allocation  59.8%  38  59.5%  466  -1.6% 
% fixed income allocation  31.7%  34  19.5%  466  -2.3% 
Spending  rate  5.0% 231  5.0% 447  0.5% 
Total  students  1590 595  1740 595  0.8% 
SAT math 75th percentile  590  428  620  420  6.3% 
Tuition  ($)  14,331 429  19,600 595  2.5% 
 
Sources:  National Association of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO) and the College Board. 
Note:  Statistics are presented for all schools and three subsamples: the Ivy League (Harvard, Yale, Princeton, 
University of Pennsylvania, Columbia, Dartmouth, Brown, and Cornell), public schools, and private 
schools (excluding the Ivy League). Allocations to equities, fixed income, and alternative investments are 
in percentages of the total market value of the endowment. The columns under “# schools” show the 
number of schools for which the data are available in each year.  The “median growth” column shows 
median values in each subsample for the mean annual growth rate of each variable from 1993 to 2005 for 
schools with data available in all years. Dollar values are adjusted to 2005 values and returns are deflated 
using the Consumer Price Index.  23 
Table 2 
 















Harvard University  25.47  16.2% 7.61  9.7%
Yale University  15.22  19.3% 3.95  10.9%
Stanford University  12.40  16.6% 2.84  12.0%
Princeton University  10.72  14.1% 3.91  8.1%
Massachusetts Institute of Technology  6.71  14.7% 2.13  9.2%
University of California  5.04  7.6% 2.03  7.2%
The Texas A&M University System  4.96  14.8% 2.06  7.0%
University of Michigan  4.93  7.0% 0.84  14.5%
Columbia University  4.93  16.2% 2.09  6.8%
University of Texas System  4.79  10.8% 1.30  10.5%
Emory University  4.38  4.2% 2.30  5.1%
University of Pennsylvania  4.37  5.8% 1.21  10.4%
Washington University  4.25  7.4% 1.75  7.0%
Northwestern University  4.22  12.3% 1.47  8.4%
University of Chicago  4.14  15.2% 1.54  7.9%
Duke University  3.83  15.2% 0.88  11.9%
Cornell University  3.78  10.8% 1.43  7.8%
University of Notre Dame  3.65  16.1% 0.96  10.8%
Rice University  3.61  10.8% 1.74  5.8%
University of Virginia  3.22  11.5% 0.61  13.6%
 
 
Source: National  Association  of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO). 
Notes:  The first column shows endowment values at the end of fiscal year 2005.  The second 
column displays real investment returns net of fees in the 2004-2005 fiscal year for the 
total endowment.  The third column shows the market values of these endowments at 
the end of the 1992 fiscal year adjusted for inflation, and last column shows the 
annualized real growth rate between 1992 and 2005. 
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Figure 1  
 
Excess returns by school type 






Source: National  Association  of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO). 
Note:  Median excess returns are shown for schools in each category which reported at least 
10 years of return data between 1992 and 2005.  “Large endowment” denotes schools 
in the top quartile of endowment size in 1992, and “High SAT” denotes schools in the 
top quartile of SAT score in the sample in 1992.  The “Private”“Large endowment” 





















Source: National  Association  of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO). 
Note:  Asset values for each asset class are aggregated across all schools with at least 10 





Alternative asset allocation by school type and year 
(median fraction of total assets invested in alternative asset classes, including hedge funds, 






Source: National  Association  of College and University Business Officers (NACUBO). 
Note:  Based on data for schools which reported at least 10 years of return data between 1992 
and 2005.  “Large endowment” denotes schools in the top quartile of endowment size 
in 1992, and “High SAT” denotes schools in the top quartile of SAT score in the 
sample in 1992.  The “Private”, “Large endowment”, and “High SAT” categories 







Year  All Ivy  League  Private 
Large 
endowment High  SAT 
Return Bench Return Bench Return Bench Return Bench Return Bench
1994  5.8 -1.1 8.5 -0.1 3.4 -2.1 3.3 -1.9  3.3 -2.0
1995 16.1 16.2 16.4 17.2 16.0 16.2 16.5 16.5 16.0 16.2
1996  19.7    16.6 24.4  19.6 18.7 16.5 18.9 16.7  19.1  16.8
1997 21.5 21.4 24.6 21.4 20.7 22.0 20.8 22.2 20.4 21.6
1998 18.6 20.9 19.1 21.0 18.8 21.2 18.5 21.3 18.7 21.1
1999 10.4 15.8 11.9 16.2 9.7 16.1 10.0 16.3 10.3 16.4
2000 20.2 15.9 26.8 24.1 18.5 14.2 21.0 16.0 21.9 16.8
2001 -2.9 -8.9 2.4 -7.3 -4.2 -9.5 -4.7 -9.5 -4.6 -9.5
2002  -4.5 -12.1 -0.8 -11.5 -5.4 -12.4 -5.4 -12.4  -5.2 -12.4
2003 4.6 0.2 9.1 0.2 3.7 0.2 3.3 0.0 3.3  -0.1
2004 17.3 11.3 19.5 10.0 16.6 11.9 17.2 11.6 17.1 11.6
2005  13.1 6.1 16.9 6.9 12.2 6.1 13.0 6.3  13.5 6.6
Mean  11.7% 8.5% 14.9% 9.8% 10.7% 8.4% 11.0% 8.6%  11.1% 8.6%
 
 
Sources:  Endowment returns are from the National Association of College and University 
Business Officers (NACUBO).  The benchmark returns for equities, fixed income, 
real estate, and cash are the annual yields from the Standard & Poor’s 500, the 
Lehman US Aggregate bond index, the Case-Shiller index, and the three-month 
treasury rate, respectively.  The benchmark returns for alternative assets are equal-
weighted averages of the one-year returns for private equity and venture capital 
investments reported in the VentureXpert database and hedge fund returns as reported 
in the Hennessee Hedge Fund Index. 
Notes:  Based on data for schools which reported at least 10 years of total return data. Total 
endowment returns and benchmark returns are presented for six samples of schools.  
“Large endowment” denotes schools in the top quartile of endowment size in 1992, 
and “High SAT” denotes schools in the top quartile of SAT score in the sample in 
1992.  The “Private”, “Large endowment”, and “High SAT” categories exclude 
schools in the Ivy League.  For each subset “Return” indicates the value-weighted 
average endowment return, and “Bench” indicates benchmark returns calculated from 
allocations of each group of endowments to five asset classes: equities, fixed income, 
real estate, alternatives, and other.  The benchmark return is calculated as the average 
return of asset class indices weighted by the percentage of total assets allocated at the 
end of the previous fiscal year to each asset class.    
 